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HOLDING “HIRED GUNS” ACCOUNTABLE: 
THE LEGAL STATUS OF PRIVATE 
SECURITY CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ 
David H. Chen* 
Abstract: Since the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, thousands of armed 
civilians have worked in that country providing security. The law govern-
ing these “private security contractors” (PSCs), however, has never been 
clear. Despite several instances involving Iraqi civilian deaths, there is 
still no set procedure for holding PCSs accountable. Several options 
have been suggested, and trying PSCs in federal district courts in the 
United States seems to be emerging as the preferred method. This Note 
argues, however, that military-run courts-martial in Iraq are preferable 
for several reasons. 
Introduction 
 On September 16, 2007, members of a private security firm known 
as Blackwater Worldwide1 were escorting a convoy of U.S. State De-
partment personnel through western Baghdad.2 As the convoy passed 
through Nisour Square, the Blackwater guards, perceiving some threat, 
opened fire on several civilian vehicles.3 Seventeen Iraqis were killed in 
the incident; a subsequent Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) report 
found that fourteen of these killings were unjustified.4 
 Prior to the Nisour Square incident, private security contractors 
(PSCs)5 had already been involved in several high-profile incidents in 
                                                                                                                      
* David H. Chen is the Managing Editor for the Boston College International & Compara-
tive Law Review. 
1 At the time, the company was known as “Blackwater USA”; it has since changed its 
name to “Blackwater Worldwide” but will be referred to simply as “Blackwater” in this 
Note. See Blackwater Home Page, http://www.blackwaterusa.com/about/ (last visited Nov. 
17, 2007) (providing a brief description of the company and its capabilities). 
2 See Blackwater Incident: What Happened, BBC News Online, Oct. 8, 2007, http://news. 
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7033332.stm. 
3 See id. 
4 See David Johnston & John M. Broder, F.B.I. Says Guards Killed 14 Iraqis Without Cause, 
N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 2007, at A1. 
5 The very phrase “private security contractors” creates some confusion. See, e.g., Peter 
W. Singer, Outsourcing War: Understanding the Private Military Industry, Foreign Affairs, 
Mar. 1, 2005, at 119 [hereinafter Singer, Outsourcing War] (describing “private military 
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Iraq.6 The killing of four Blackwater personnel in Fallujah sparked a 
fierce battle7 in that city in April 2004.8 Several civilian contractors 
were also involved in the notorious Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse.9 With 
traditional military forces in short supply, the United States has re-
cently relied on PSCs to perform missions traditionally falling to sol-
diers or marines.10 Such missions include protecting fixed sites and 
guarding the numerous U.S. civilians in Iraq, such as members of the 
State Department and (until it was disbanded in 2004) the Coalitional 
Provisional Authority (CPA).11 As PSC visibility has increased, how-
ever, their legal status has come under scrutiny.12 Nisour Square pro-
vides a telling example: the Iraqi government quickly declared the 
killings unjustified and demanded compensatory payments for the 
victims’ families,13 and some Iraqis have demanded prosecution.14 
The incident has thus brought into sharp focus a question unan-
swered since the start of the Iraq War—what law should apply to PSCs 
for crimes committed in that conflict?15 
 This Note attempts to answer that question. Part I contains an 
overview of three ways that PSCs might be prosecuted for crimes 
                                                                                                                      
firms” as “businesses that provide governments with professional services intricately linked 
to warfare”). For the purposes of this Note, I will define PSCs as “armed foreign civilians in 
Iraq providing security under private government contract,” thus excluding Iraqi nation-
als, U.S. contractors who operate solely in the United States, and unarmed contractors 
used exclusively in logistical roles. See Renae Merle, Census Counts 100,000 Contractors in 
Iraq, Wash. Post, Dec. 5, 2006, at D1; see also Barry Yeoman, Op-Ed., Need an Army? Just 
Pick Up the Phone, N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 2004, at A19. 
6 See, e.g., MG Taguba, Article 15–6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police 
Brigade 48, available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/corpwatch.org/downloads/taguba.pdf; 
The High Risk Contracting Business, PBS Frontline, June 21, 2005, http://www.pbs.org/ 
wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/warriors/contractors/highrisk.html. 
7 This “First Battle of Fallujah” was inconclusive, and should not be confused with the 
“Second Battle of Fallujah” in November 2004, in which Coalition forces established con-
trol of the city. See Tom Lasseter, Unceasing Violence: Three Days of Pounding from Bullets and 
Explosives Wear on the Men of Alpha Company, Phila. Inquirer, Nov. 30, 2004, at A2. 
8 See The High Risk Contracting Business, supra note 6. 
9 See Taguba, supra note 6, at 48 (recommending that two civilian employees of a pri-
vate security firm known as CACI be reprimanded for their role). 
10 See P.W. Singer, Commentary, Above Law, Above Decency, L.A. Times, May 2, 2004, at 5 
[hereinafter Singer, Above Law]. 
11 See generally Dana Priest, Militia Attack Repelled by Private Security Firms: Sunday Clash 
Highlights Shadowy Presence of Hired Guns in Iraq, Seattle Times, Apr. 6, 2004, at A2. 
12 See, e.g., Singer, Above Law, supra note 10, at 5. 
13 See Iraq Urges Blackwater Prosecution, BBC News Online, Oct. 8, 2007, http://news. 
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7033048.stm. 
14 See id. 
15 See generally Alissa J. Rubin & Paul von Zielbauer, The Judgment Gap: In a Case Like the 
Blackwater Shootings, Many Laws But More Obstacles, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 2007, at A1. 
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committed in Iraq: Iraqi jurisdiction, U.S. civilian jurisdiction, and 
U.S. military jurisdiction.16 Part II presents some of the procedural 
and jurisdictional issues that might arise from each. Finally, Part III 
assesses their relative merits, and concludes that U.S. military jurisdic-
tion is the best option. 
I. Background 
 The United States made extensive use of contractors in its late-
twentieth-century overseas involvements, but most provided supplies, 
not security, and were therefore not PSCs for the purposes of this 
Note.17 While armed contractors guarded U.S. diplomats in Haiti in 
1994,18 they were few in number.19 It was not until the 2003 invasion 
of Iraq that PSCs appeared in force, performing tasks “far more ex-
tensive . . . than in past wars.”20 
 The PSC phenomenon is so recent that there is little applicable 
case law.21 Any prosecution would be precedent-setting, and an 
analysis must begin with an overview of the laws that might apply 
should one occur.22 First, PSCs might simply be prosecuted under 
Iraqi criminal law,23 since states generally have jurisdiction over 
crimes committed within their territory, regardless of the defen-
dant’s nationality.24 The law likely to be applied in this scenario is 
                                                                                                                      
16 Another option would be to subject PSCs to the jurisdiction of some international 
body, such as the International Criminal Court; this raises jurisdictional issues beyond the 
scope of this Note. See generally Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Part II, 
July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 999, 1003–11. 
17 See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Military Operations: High-Level DOD 
Action Needed to Address Long-Standing Problems with Management and Over-
sight of Contractors Supporting Deployed Forces 1 (2006), available at http://www. 
gao.gov/new.items/d07145.pdf; see also Merle, supra note 5. 
18 See John M. Broder & David Rohde, State Department Use of Contractors Leaps in 4 Years, 
N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 2007, at A1. 
19 See id. 
20 Singer, Outsourcing War, supra note 5, at 120. The total number of PSCs in Iraq is not 
clear, but one estimate places the number at 6000. See id. 
21 See Fredrick A. Stein, Have We Closed the Barn Door Yet? A Look at the Current Loopholes 
in the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, 27 Hous. J. Int’l L. 579, 599 (2005). 
22 See id. at 581–86. 
23 See Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, art. 1(b) (2003) (Iraq), available at http:// 
www.cpa-iraq.org/human_rights/Statute.htm (stating that the Tribunal, which was prom-
ulgated by the CPA, only has jurisdiction over Iraqi nationals and residents). 
24 See American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) (“[T]he gen-
eral and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be 
determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done.”). One of several ex-
ceptions can include the “status of forces” treaties the United States often negotiates with 
states in which it maintains a permanent military presence. See Christopher Dickey, The 
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the Iraqi Penal Code of 1969,25 under which Iraqi courts currently 
operate.26 
 Second, PSCs might be prosecuted under U.S. civilian law.27 The 
basis of jurisdiction under this option is nationality; states often exer-
cise jurisdiction over their citizens even when they are abroad.28 The 
Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) of 2000 appears to 
grant federal courts authorization to hear cases involving PSCs by giv-
ing them jurisdiction over those who commit crimes “while employed 
by or accompanying the Armed Forces outside the United States.”29 It 
is therefore possible that criminal charges could be brought against 
PSCs in U.S. district court.30 
 Regarding this second option, it should be noted that because the 
MEJA language initially seemed to exempt PSCs whose contracts were 
not with the Department of Defense (such as Blackwater, whose con-
tract was with the Department of State), Congress recently amended 
the statute,31 which now governs those “employed by the Armed Forces 
outside the United States . . . to the extent such employment relates to 
supporting the mission of the Department of Defense overseas.”32 
                                                                                                                      
Rule of Order 17, Newsweek Web (2006), http://www.newsweek.com/id/52473/output/ 
print. At present, there is no such treaty between the United States and Iraq. See id. 
25 See Penal Code, § 3, ¶¶ 412–13 (1969) (Iraq), available at https://www.jagcnet. 
army.mil/JAGCNETInternet/Homepages/AC/CLAMO-Public.nsf. Regarding the Nisour 
Square incident, the relevant statute would likely be either “Assault Leading to Death,” 
maximum of 15 years imprisonment, or “Manslaughter,” 1–7 years imprisonment. See id. 
26 See Christopher M. Ford, Speak No Evil: Targeting a Population’s Neutrality to Defeat an 
Insurgency, 35 Parameters 51, 51 (2005). 
27 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1112(a) (2007) (defining voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, 
the charges most likely to be brought for the Nisour Square incident under federal civilian 
law); see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 1112(b) (2007) (establishing sentences for the respective 
crimes). 
28 See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436 (1932) (“By virtue of the obligations 
of citizenship, the United States retained its authority over [Blackmer], and he was bound 
by its laws made applicable to him in a foreign country.”); see also United States v. Yousef, 
327 F.3d 56, 86 (2d Cir. 2006) (“although there is a presumption that Congress does not 
intend a statute to apply to conduct outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States 
. . . that presumption can be overcome when Congress clearly expresses its intent to do 
so”) (citation omitted). 
29 See 18 U.S.C.A, § 3261(a) (2007). It is worth noting that the MEJA is inapplicable if 
charges are brought by a foreign government, but can apply even if charges are brought 
under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3261(b)–(c) (2007). 
30 See id. 
31 See Stein, supra note 21, at 598–600. 
32 18 U.S.C.A. § 3267(1)(A) (2007). 
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 The third and final option would be for PSCs to be prosecuted 
under U.S. military law;33 as with civilian law, the basis of jurisdiction 
would be the nationality of the accused.34 The Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice (UCMJ) is the law that governs members of the U.S. 
Armed Forces,35 and its jurisdiction generally does not extend to civil-
ians.36 Indeed, a military court “has no jurisdiction beyond that given 
it by statute, and, since there is no statute giving it jurisdiction over 
persons not in the military service, it may not assume such jurisdic-
tion either as a matter of convenience or public policy.”37 As with the 
MEJA, however, recent changes to the UCMJ jurisdictional statute may 
have given military courts the necessary authority.38 
 10 U.S.C. § 802(a) lists the categories of persons subject to 
courts-martial jurisdiction.39 Prior to 2006, one of these was, “in time 
of war, persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the 
field.”40 In 1970, a court ruled that the first clause rendered the stat-
ute inapplicable except in times of declared war.41 Congress, however, 
recently addressed the “declared war” issue.42 In 2006, it added a key 
clause:43 UCMJ jurisdiction now extends over, “[i]n time of declared 
war or a contingency operation, persons serving with or accompanying an 
armed force in the field.”44 The purpose of this addition seems 
                                                                                                                      
33 See 10 U.S.C.A. § 919 (2007) (defining both voluntary and involuntary manslaugh-
ter, the charges most likely to be filed under military law for the Nisour Square incident). 
34 See Blackmer, 284 U.S. at 436. 
35 See Stein, supra note 21, at 581 (stating that art. I, § 8 of the U.S. Constitution pro-
vides Congress with the authority to make rules for the Armed Forces). 
36 See, e.g., Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960) (holding that 
UCMJ is not applicable to dependents of service members for non-capital crimes); Reid v. 
Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1957) (holding that the UCMJ is not applicable to dependants 
of service members for capital crimes); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 22 
(1955) (holding that the UCMJ is not applicable to former service members who had re-
verted to civilian status). 
37 Ex parte Wilson, 33 F.2d 214, 215 (D.C. Va. 1929). 
38 See John M. Broder & James Risen, Armed Guards in Iraq Occupy a Legal Limbo, N.Y. 
Times, Sept. 20, 2007, at A1. 
39 See 10 U.S.C.A. § 802(a) (2007). 
40 10 U.S.C.A. § 802(a)(10) (2005). 
41 See United States v. Averette, 41 C.M.R. 363, 365 (C.M.A. 1970); see also 3 Federal 
Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 5:96 (2007). 
42 See Eugene R. Fidell, Commentary, Zen and the Jurisprudence of the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Armed Forces, 54 Fed. Lawyer 28, 30 (2007). 
43 See 10 U.S.C.A. § 802(a) (2007). 
44 Id. (emphasis added). 
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clear—to avoid the declared war distinction previously used to deny 
UCMJ jurisdiction over civilians.45 
II. Discussion 
A. Iraqi Law 
 The largest obstacle to prosecuting PSCs under Iraqi law is the 
immunity they have already been given from such prosecution.46 In 
2004,47 CPA leader L. Paul Bremer (who relied on PSCs for his own 
personal protection) issued a proclamation (CPA Order 17) concern-
ing the “status of certain . . . personnel in Iraq.”48 Section 4 of this or-
der, entitled “Contractors,” stated that “[c]ontractors shall be immune 
from Iraqi legal process with respect to acts performed by them pur-
suant to the terms and conditions of a Contract.”49 
 While the Iraqi government has expressed a desire to prosecute 
those responsible for Nisour Square, it has not (as of this Note) for-
mally repealed CPA Order 17.50 Until and unless it does, the PSC im-
munity is still in effect, and there would be no Iraqi jurisdiction for 
the Nisour Square incident unless it was asserted retroactively.51 
B. U.S. Civilian Law 
 Despite legislative attempts to close gaps in the law, the jurisdic-
tion of U.S. federal courts over PSCs (as defined by this Note) is un-
tested.52 Only three persons have been prosecuted under the MEJA to 
                                                                                                                      
45 See Wm. C. Peters, On Law, Wars, and Mercenaries: The Case for Courts-Martial Jurisdic-
tion Over Civilian Contractor Misconduct in Iraq, 2006 BYU L. Rev. 367, 397. 
46 See Dickey, supra note 24. 
47 See id. (noting that Iraqi sovereignty was formally restored, and Bremer departed the 
country on the following day—June 28, 2004). 
48 Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 17 at 1 ( June 27, 2004), available at http:// 
www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/20040627_CPAORD_17_Status_of_Coalition_Rev_with_Annex_ 
A.pdf. 
49 Id. at 5. 
50 See Alissa J. Rubin, Iraqi Cabinet Votes to End Security Firms’ Immunity, N.Y. Times, Oct. 
31, 2007, at A10. Iraq has approved draft legislation to this end, which is pending ratifica-
tion by its Parliament. See id. 
51 See Steven Lee Myers & Sam Dagher, Agreement with Iraq over Troops Is at Risk, N.Y. 
Times, Sept. 19, 2008, at A6 (noting that disagreements over contractor immunity have 
prevented Iraq and the United States from reaching an “agreement to extend the Ameri-
can military mandate.”). 
52 See Peters, supra note 45, at 385.As this Note was going to print, federal prosecutors had 
just indicted five of the Blackwater personnel involved in the Nisour Square incident for man-
slaughter. See 5 Guards Charged with Manslaughter in Iraq Deaths, NYTimes.com, Dec. 8, 2008, 
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date: the wife of a U.S. serviceman stationed in Turkey,53 a dual Cana-
dian/Iraqi citizen serving as an interpreter,54 and a former Marine 
charged after leaving the military.55 There is thus no clear precedent 
for using the MEJA in a situation like Nisour Square.56 
 There is reason to think that use of the MEJA against PSCs might 
be upheld, however, as Iraq certainly appears to be a “Department of 
Defense mission.”57 There are, after all, approximately 165,000 U.S. 
troops currently present,58 with a U.S. Army general (as opposed to a 
State Department official) in overall command.59 Furthermore, the 
clear intent behind amending the MEJA seems to have been permit-
ting prosecution of PSCs in federal district court.60 
 Notwithstanding the unanswered question of jurisdiction, the ma-
jor difficulty with U.S. civilian prosecution of PSCs is logistical.61 For 
                                                                                                                      
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/washington/AP-Blackwater-Prosecution.html?emc=eta1. 
The defendants’ attorneys planned to “argue that the guards cannot be charged under a law 
intended to cover soldiers and military contractors since the men worked as civilian contrac-
tors for the State Department.” Id. Prosecutors noted, however, that because the PSCs were 
“supporting the military’s mission” in Baghdad, they were covered by the MEJA. See id. 
53 See generally United States v. Arnt, 474 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2007). Note that the consti-
tutionality of the MEJA was not challenged. See id. 
54 See Michael R. Gordon, Military Role Overseeing Contractors Tested in Iraq, N.Y. Times, 
Apr. 6, 2008, at A16 (noting defendant’s intention to challenge U.S. jurisdiction). The 
interpreter “was sentenced to five months of confinement after pleading guilty in the stab-
bing of a colleague.” Two U.S. Soldiers Killed in Iraq After Small-Town Meeting, Seattle Times, 
June 24, 2008, at A5. 
55 See Acquittal of Former Marine in Landmark Case Expected to Cause Change in Legislation, 
Says Defense Team, Biotech Week, Sept. 24, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 17737925. The 
Marine, Jose Luis Nazario Jr., was acquitted of murder charges stemming from an incident 
during the November 2004 Battle of Fallujah. See id. Significantly, “[e]ven one of MEJA’s 
authors, Senator Jeff Sessions, has been quoted as saying that this type of prosecution was 
not the motivation behind MEJA.” Id. (emphasis added). 
56 See id. Another statutory means of doing so, the 1996 War Crimes Act, is probably 
inapplicable to the Nisour Square incident; the War Crimes Act is designed to prosecute 
civilians for crimes that would be punishable under the Geneva Conventions, such as will-
ful killing or torture. See Peters, supra note 45, at 392–93. It should also be noted that an 
extradition treaty between the United States and Iraq may still technically be in effect, 
although it dates back to the Iraqi monarchy. See Extradition Treaty, U.S.-Iraq, June 7, 
1934, 49 Stat. 3380. 
57 See 18 U.S.C. § 3267(1)(A) (West 2007). 
58 See Editorial, Veterans’ Sacrifice: The Iraq War Has Increased America’s Debt to Them, 
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Nov. 12, 2007, at B6. 
59 See Peter Baker, Bush Aides Enter Damage Control Mode: Petraeus Appointment Their Last, 
Best Hope in Iraq, Journal Gazette (Fort Wayne, Ind.), Feb. 7, 2007, at A7. General David 
H. Petraeus was in command of the Multi-National Force-Iraq effective February 2007. See 
id. 
60 See Stein, supra note 21, at 599. 
61 See, e.g., Peters, supra note 45, at 388–89. 
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example, any trial would involve transporting witnesses, parties, and 
evidence to the United States.62 Regarding investigations, although 
there are FBI personnel stationed in Iraq, their focus is counter-
terrorism; the team that investigated the Nisour Square shooting had to 
be deployed from the United States.63 Investigations would undoubt-
edly be hampered by such delays, as well as by unfamiliarity with local 
culture, security issues, and interagency disputes that could well arise.64 
C. U.S. Military Law 
 As there have been no court rulings on the latest amendment to 
the UCMJ jurisdictional statute, it remains unclear whether PSCs may 
now be court-martialed.65 A remaining issue could potentially be the 
phrase “serving with or accompanying an armed force.”66 A court 
could interpret it to refer only to PSCs physically accompanied by 
troops at the time in question, which might exempt PSCs operating in-
dependently.67 A court could also interpret the “armed force” phrase 
to refer only to PSCs employed by the Department of Defense, as op-
posed to the Department of State or another federal agency; this 
would also exempt the PSCs involved in the Nisour Square incident.68 
 The actual procedures for court-martialing a PSC under the 
UCMJ are uncertain.69 For example, UCMJ action is initiated when a 
commissioned officer with command authority over the accused for-
mally prefers charges against them.70 PSCs operate outside the mili-
tary chain of command, however, and it is unclear which officers (if 
any) might have the authority to do so.71 Since the military does not 
                                                                                                                      
62 See David Herszenhorn, House’s Iraq Bill Applies U.S. Laws to Contractors, N.Y. Times, 
Oct. 5, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/05/washington/05cong.html. 
63 See id. 
64 See Jeremy Scahill, Op-Ed., Blackwater’s Loopholes, L.A. Times, Nov. 16, 2007, at A25; see 
also 5 Guards Charged with Manslaughter in Iraq Deaths, supra note 52 (noting that these same 
issues were projected to cause difficulties for the prosecution). 
65 See generally Peters, supra note 45. 
66 10 U.S.C.A. § 802(a)(10) (2007). 
67 See id. U.S. military personnel do not appear to have been present during the shoot-
ings at Nisour Square. See Blackwater Incident: What Happened, supra note 2. State Depart-
ment personnel, however, were presumably present as Blackwater was escorting a State 
Department convoy. See id. If any were armed, that might satisfy the “armed force” clause. 
See 10 U.S.C.A. § 802(a)(10) (2007). 
68 See 10 U.S.C.A. § 802(a)(10) (2007); Broder & Rohde, supra note 18. 
69 See Fidell, supra note 42, at 30. 
70 See 10 U.S.C.A. § 830 (2007). 
71 See id. 
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have a formal procedure for court-martialing PSCs, one would have to 
be improvised.72 
 Another issue is that all U.S. service members take an oath to 
obey orders “according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice.”73 Lacking such a clause in their employment contracts, 
PSCs might argue that UCMJ jurisdiction is improper; they might also 
challenge constitutionality based on the absence of grand jury in-
dictments or civilian juries—the primary differences between military 
and civilian trials.74 
III. Analysis 
A. The Case Against Iraqi Jurisdiction 
 There are two main arguments for Iraqi jurisdiction. First, lifting 
PSC immunity could increase the legitimacy of the Iraqi govern-
ment—a major goal, after all, of the current U.S. involvement.75 Sec-
ond, the U.S. Executive branch has thus far shown little inclination to 
hold PSCs accountable for their actions.76 Although the FBI investiga-
tion into the Nisour Square incident may indicate a change in policy, 
it is unclear whether charges will follow.77 
 A strong argument against Iraqi jurisdiction, however, is the po-
tential for bias against PSCs by Iraqi courts.78 Regardless of whether 
such bias is real, if the perception arose, subjecting PSCs to Iraqi ju-
                                                                                                                      
72 See generally Manual For Courts-Martial, United States (2008 ed.) (outlining 
court-martial procedures for uniformed service members only), available at http://www. 
au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/law/mcm.pdf. 
73 10 U.S.C.A. § 502(a) (2007). 
74 See Anthony Giardino, Using Extraterritorial Jurisdiction to Prosecute Violations of the Law 
of War: Looking Beyond the War Crimes Act, 48 B.C. L. Rev. 699, 719 (2007). See generally Reid 
v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (rejecting UCMJ jurisdiction over civilian in part because of 
Fifth and Sixth Amendment considerations). 
75 See Alissa J. Rubin & Andrew E. Kramer, Iraqi Premier Says Blackwater Shootings Chal-
lenge His Nation’s Sovereignty, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 2007, at A6. 
76 See, e.g., Eric Schmitt, Report Details Shooting by Drunken Blackwater Worker, N.Y. Times, 
Oct. 1, 2007, at A10. In December 2006, after a Blackwater employee allegedly shot and 
killed a bodyguard of one of Iraq’s vice presidents, the State Department arranged for him 
to be sent back to the United States almost immediately. See id. Although an FBI investiga-
tion is ongoing in Seattle, no charges have been filed as of this Note. See John M. Broder, 
Ex-Paratrooper Is Suspect in Drunken Killing of Iraqi, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 2007, at A10. 
77 See Karen DeYoung, Immunity Jeopardizes Iraq Probe, Wash. Post, Oct. 30, 2007, at A1. 
Federal prosecution of the PSCs involved—presumably under the MEJA—was complicated 
recently by reports that State Department officials had granted limited immunity to Black-
water personnel involved in the incident during their initial investigation. See id. 
78 See Rubin & von Zielbauer, supra note 15. 
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risdiction would probably decrease the number of non-Iraqi civilians 
willing to work there.79 Besides PSCs, there are thousands of such con-
tractors in Iraq performing such critical tasks as restoring the oil in-
frastructure, training police, and advising the Defense Ministry.80 
These contractors might be unwilling to stay for fear of being brought 
before Iraqi courts of questionable fairness.81 Even if such an attitude 
was held only by PSCs, a mass exodus of that group alone would force 
many civilian agencies to find alternate methods of operating in a 
hostile environment.82 The gap might have to be filled by thinly-
spread U.S. military forces; if these were unavailable, civilian agencies 
could be severely limited in their activities.83 Any legitimacy gained by 
Iraqi prosecution of PSCs could thus be offset by instability.84 
B. The Case for Military Jurisdiction 
 Courts martial are currently conducted in Iraq for military per-
sonnel; the infrastructure prosecuting PSCs is therefore already in 
place.85 Iraqi witnesses are more easily brought before tribunals in 
that country, and U.S. personnel who testify are likewise able to 
quickly return to their normal duties.86 PSC trials in district court, by 
contrast, could require transporting Iraqi, U.S. military, and PSC wit-
nesses between Iraq and the United States, removing the latter two 
groups from areas where they are sorely needed for long periods.87 
 Another argument supporting military over civilian jurisdiction is 
that military tribunals have experience with issues likely to arise with 
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PSCs.88 PSCs resemble soldiers far more than civilians in Iraq—they 
carry weapons in a dangerous environment where the use of deadly 
force is common.89 While court-martialing civilians might infringe on 
the “Constitutional right . . . to a trial by one’s peers” in a strict con-
structionist sense, being judged by persons who are likewise familiar 
with the stress of combat is arguably closer to the Framers’ intent be-
hind the “peers” language.90 The UCMJ could also be revised to re-
quire grand jury indictments in cases involving PSCs, thus solving the 
Fifth Amendment problem.91 
 The application of military law has already proven effective.92 Fol-
lowing the prisoner abuse scandal at Abu Ghraib, eleven U.S. soldiers 
were convicted for their respective roles, receiving sentences of up to 
ten years in prison.93 Perhaps because the UCMJ was applied to such 
effect,94 no such scandal has since occurred; in contrast, there have 
already been two other reported killings of civilians involving PSCs 
since the Nisour Square incident.95 
 Other problems that might arise with the application of military 
law are not insurmountable. UCMJ articles inapplicable to PSCs sim-
ply need not be applied.96 Judge Advocate officers could both prose-
cute and defend PSCs; the UCMJ already allows for civilian attorneys 
to supplement defense counsel and this provision could easily be ex-
                                                                                                                      
88 See generally Priest, supra note 11. 
89 See id. 
90 Giardino, supra note 74, at 738. 
91 See U.S. Const. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a . . . crime, 
unless on a[n] indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval 
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger . . . .”). 
92 See, e.g., Gonzalez, 2007 WL 2340508 at *1; Wise, 64 M.J. at 470; see also Singer, Above 
Law, supra note 10. 
93 See Graner Gets Ten Years for Abu Ghraib Abuse, MSNBC.com, Jan. 16, 2005, http:// 
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6795956/. One officer was court-martialed but acquitted of all 
but a minor charge. See Josh White, Abu Ghraib Officer Cleared of Detainee Abuse, Wash. Post, 
Aug. 29, 2007, at A5. 
94 See Christian Davenport & Michael Amon, Three to Be Arraigned in Prison Abuse, 
Wash. Post, May 19, 2004, at A1 (noting that charges were preferred a month after the 
Abu Ghraib story became public); see also Graner Gets Ten Years, supra note 93 (noting that 
the Abu Ghraib story broke in April 2004). 
95 See, e.g., Joshua Partlow & Zaid Sabah, U.S. Security Firm Involved in Shooting of Iraqi 
Driver, Wash. Post, Nov. 12, 2007, at A16 (reporting a shooting by PSCs from DynCorp In-
ternational); Jomana Karadsheh & Elise Labott, Australian Security Firm Involved in Shooting, 
Iraq Official Says, CNN.com, Oct. 8, 2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/10/ 
09/iraq.main/index.html?eref=time_world. 
96 See, e.g., 10 U.S.C.A. § 933 (2007) (defining UCMJ Article 133, Conduct Unbecom-
ing an Officer and a Gentleman). 
112 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 32:101 
tended.97 Acknowledgement of UCMJ authority could be required of 
all PSC contracts.98 Finally, PSCs could be brought under direct mili-
tary control, thus facilitating the military’s ability to prosecute when 
necessary.99 This last action would have the added benefit of provid-
ing more oversight over PSC actions, a deterrence to future miscon-
duct regardless of which law is applied.100 
 Aside from potential Constitutional issues, there are several other 
negatives associated with UCMJ jurisdiction for PSCs.101 The increased 
case load would certainly burden the limited number of military lawyers 
in Iraq, and adding supervisory duties over PSCs would increase the 
burden for combat troops as well.102 The alternative, however, is to 
place that burden on either U.S. district courts on another continent,103 
or an Iraqi judicial system unable to handle its own case load.104 
 If the phrase “a person accompanying an armed force” is inter-
preted very broadly, there could be unintended consequences from 
expanding military jurisdiction.105 The phrase could theoretically in-
clude an embedded reporter, for example, allowing the military to 
court-martial members of the media.106 The UCMJ jurisdictional stat-
ute could be revised, however, to avoid this possibility.107 
Conclusion 
 PSCs must not remain outside any legitimate jurisdiction. Combat, 
in which PSCs are now unequivocally involved, is chaotic and deadly 
even with some force of law acting as a restraint; arming and training 
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people to kill without holding them accountable for their actions allows 
violence to spiral out of control.108 
 Whether accurate or not, the perceived partiality of the Iraqi jus-
tice system makes this an unpalatable option for prosecuting PSCs. 
Such a move might appease Iraqis in the short term, but would likely 
reduce the number of foreign civilians willing to work there, and thus 
hamstring the country’s long-term rebuilding efforts. While district 
courts could provide a fair trial, the logistical challenges of investigating 
and prosecuting crimes in Iraq from the United States would be great. 
Furthermore, the question of which killings in combat zones are unjus-
tified is one unfamiliar to most federal prosecutors, judges, and defense 
lawyers. 
 The best solution is to hold PSCs legally accountable under the 
UCMJ. To do this, they must be brought under direct military control 
to facilitate the military’s ability to prefer charges when necessary, and 
to deter unlawful conduct. Acceptance of UCMJ jurisdiction should be 
a prerequisite for the awarding of any U.S. government security con-
tract. At a lower level, acknowledgment of UCMJ jurisdiction should be 
a clause in every individual PSC’s contract. 
 It is worth noting that if its military were large enough to meet 
the security requirements of its foreign policy, the United States’ need 
for PSCs would largely evaporate.109 This is not to say that PSCs have 
no role to play in international relations. There has been debate, for 
example, about using PSCs to help keep the peace in Darfur, where 
many states have been loath to commit regular troops.110 
 A discussion on the merits of using PSCs is beyond the scope of 
this Note. What is clear is that PSCs must be legally accountable for 
their actions, as those actions, for better or worse, reflect directly 
upon those who employ them. 
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